Post-War Peacebuilding Reviewed

A Critical Exploration Of Generic Approaches To Post-War Reconstruction

Monica Llamazares

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To Post-War Reconstruction

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Contents

1. Introduction 1

2. What is post-war peacebuilding? 2

3. Converging definitions of post-war peacebuilding: The emergence of a theoretical post-war peacebuilding model 3
   3.1. What kind of peace should be built? 4
   3.2. What sources of conflict should the intervention address? 6
   3.3. Who should guide the intervention? 10
   3.4. What level of the intervention should drive the process? 12
   3.5. What activities constitute post-war peacebuilding? 14
   3.6. When and for how long should post-war peacebuilding happen? 19
   3.7. Problematising this consensus 20

4. Converging post-war peacebuilding policy: The emergence of a post-war peacebuilding community 21
   4.1 Organisational overview: Some examples of convergent peacebuilding policy 23
   4.2. Explaining organisational convergence around post-war peacebuilding: Why is this happening? 26
   4.3. Exploring the process of organisational convergence: How is this happening? 27
   4.4. Challenging this convergence: The theory-practice gap 28

5. Conclusion 29

Bibliography 32
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Summary:

Peacebuilding, as a remedy for all the ailments afflicting any society emerging from war, has placed this complex and overloaded concept at the centre of a growing network of actors engaged in its formulation and implementation. This paper critically examines the implications of a growing convergence in definitions and approaches amongst this ‘international post-war peacebuilding community’.

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1. Introduction

The growth in conflict resolution Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) as well as the increasing addition of conflict resolution dimensions to development and humanitarian programs suggests that the chances of building peace from the rubble of war are now more achievable than ever (Jacobsen & Brand-Jacobsen, in Galtung, 2002, p.27). The linkages between positive peace, human security and development are no longer confined to critical voices from the field and academia, but very much part of the mainstream and increasingly entering the discourse of IR. Further still, these terms have been widely used in formulating a global security policy that is at present controversially centred around the ‘war on terror’.

This phenomenon has brought closer diverse actors such as the UN and its Agencies, donor Governments, global financial institutions, international and local NGOs, the military, peace and conflict research institutions and the private sector, who arguably constitute what is here referred to as an ‘international post-war peacebuilding community’. The apparent convergence of international post-war peacebuilding efforts and academic enquiry is however not unproblematic. It calls for investigation of the implications of such a development. Questions must be asked as to whether the aforementioned trend translates into more effective approaches to post-war peacebuilding and more successful interventions.

The aim of this Paper is thus two-fold. First it critically explores the emergence of an ‘international post-war peacebuilding model’ in the efforts by the above-mentioned ‘community’ to define and implement a cohesive reconstruction 'package' that include peace and sustainable development as core aims. Secondly, this Paper attempts to guide future research and policy towards a more reflexive and principled enquiry, conceptualisation, and implementation of post-war peacebuilding. Section 2 will introduce a broad definition of post-war peacebuilding offered
by the UN, which is often a departure point for both research and policy making, to begin
deconstructing the term and its meaning(s), and to attempt to find a more useful characterization.
Section 3 critically examines the post-war peacebuilding literature to find evidence of an
emerging theoretical model of what constitutes ‘good’ post-war peacebuilding. Section 4 turns to
organisations involved in post-war reconstruction to find evidence of this consensual model being
applied, while exploring the context in which this conceptual and practical convergence around
post-war peacebuilding has taken place. The conclusion will summarise the implications of such a
convergence, and suggest a re-conceptualisation of post-war peacebuilding to reclaim its
transformational role.

2. What is post-war peacebuilding?

The UN’s Supplement to An Agenda for Peace defines ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ as the
“comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace
and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people. Through agreements ending
civil strife, these may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of
order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and
training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human
rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal
processes of political participation” (Boutros-Ghali, UN, 1995).

Organisational, academic, and practitioner contributions to its conceptual and practical
dimensions have expanded upon the above definition (See sections 3, 4, 5 below). Post-war
peacebuilding is now generally understood to be more than just a label to describe a project or
programme, to imply that an intervention promotes positive peace through the activities
undertaken, the process of implementation, and their impact or outcomes (Llamazares &
Reynolds Levy, 2003). The term peacebuilding can be used to describe a varied set of activities or programmes, the manner that these programmes are implemented as well as their potential outcomes. It further encompasses efforts undertaken at different levels of the intervention and implemented by different actors (Lewer, 1999, p.12). The inclusion of so many activities, levels and actors under the umbrella term peacebuilding has rendered its definition so broad that it is in danger of becoming meaningless.

The key question then is not what post-war peacebuilding is, but what it can be. If the answer is ‘just about every activity or policy that it’s undertaken to reconstruct a war-torn society’, then we need to sharpen its meaning(s) to make ‘peacebuilding’ a useful operative term for implementers/practitioners, beneficiaries and evaluators/commentators alike. However, one key aspect that remains central to the pursuit of peace is the principles underpinning assumptions, intentions and desired outcomes. Post-war peacebuilding is not only about activities, methods and impacts, but also about the intentions driving the intervention, in what must necessarily be a multi-dimensional conceptualisation of policy and implementation. The following enquiry into both the theoretical and organisational definition of post-war peacebuilding will help us identify the implicit messages of a growing consensus.

3. Converging definitions of post-war peacebuilding: The emergence of a theoretical post-war peacebuilding model

Any exploration of academic definitions of post-war peacebuilding necessarily draws from a variety of fields, including economics, political science, sociology, anthropology, psychology, peace and conflict research, reflecting and contributing to the multi-disciplinary nature of both the theory and practice of peacebuilding. A discernable consensus about post-war peacebuilding can nonetheless be identified from the contributions. The following overview will help us determine
whether such a convergence amounts to the emergence of a dominant post-war peacebuilding blueprint at the theoretical level, and the nature of this ‘model’.

The abundant definitions of post-war peacebuilding offered by the relevant literature are characterised by an attempt in each case to answer questions such as: What kind of peace should be built? What sources of conflict should the intervention address? Who should guide the peacebuilding intervention? What level of the intervention should drive the peacebuilding process? What activities constitute peacebuilding? When and for how long should peacebuilding happen? These questions will offer the framework for discussion below.

3.1. What kind of peace should be built?

An important departure point for most debates is the differentiation between negative and positive peace introduced by Johan Galtung (1975), which still underpins the distinction between narrow and broad approaches to peacebuilding. Furthermore, the often-tense relationship between negative peace promoting activities, and those undertaken to promote a positive peace has shaped many debates around what constitutes ‘good peace-building practice’.

Galtung (1975, quoted in Miall et al 1999, p.187) defined peacebuilding as encompassing the practical aspects of implementing peaceful social change through socio-economic reconstruction and development. In his latest contribution peacebuilding is re-defined as part of ‘third generation’ of peace approaches evident after the Cold War, when a reaction against simplistic approaches to building peace finally recognised the deep-rooted nature of conflict and its links to development. Galtung argues that issues of culture, human needs, and ‘fault-lines of the human condition such as gender’ have now entered the peace debate and are recognised as crucial (Galtung, 2002, xvi).
The concept of positive peace is closely linked to that of justice. Despite the consensus in the literature about the welcome move from ‘negative’ to ‘positive’ peacebuilding approaches, some authors still position themselves differently within peace-justice debate.

Baker (2001, p.759) identifies two ‘peacemaker profiles’ and attributes distinct approaches to both. For instance, whereas ‘conflict managers’ promote an inclusive approach, aim at reconciliation, employ a pragmatic focus, emphasise the process, engage local cultures and norms, presume the moral equivalence of the parties and assume a neutral role; ‘democratisers’ adhere to universal norms and values, employ an exclusive approach, aim for justice, emphasise the outcome, insist on moral accountability, believe justice to be non-negotiable, and relinquish their neutrality in favour of a principled stance. Baker places a current post-war intervention such as Kosovo firmly within the former (ibid, p.762), while Clapham blames the same approach as having precipitated the genocide in post-settlement Rwanda (1998).

Clapham further criticises this increasingly conflict resolution influenced approach being employed by international peace-building interveners, as they bring conflict parties into precarious power-sharing agreements that ignore the power imbalances and thus become hard to sustain (ibid, p.195). Baker (2001, p.756) agrees that such power-sharing arrangements fail to reflect the power leverage brought by each of the conflict parties. Furthermore, it also fails to reflect responsibility for human right abuses and war crimes committed by the very leaders that sign up to the precarious peace that often follows civil wars.

Ryan (1992, in Large, 1998, p.22) refers to peace without justice as “pacification” a situation where an unjust society is perpetuated through the suppression of violence. Rigby (2001, p.184) approaches the issue more flexibly admitting that in the initial phase of a peace settlement the
prime commitment should be to broaden and deepen the peace, before justice can be pursued. This does bring the peace process into tension with the very foundations of long-term reconciliation, namely truth, justice and ultimately forgiveness. However, the threat of recurring violence may force peacebuilders to pursue these values in sequential phases during a longer period of time that may be desirable (ibid, p.185). Woodhouse (1999) also responds to the critics of conflict resolution approaches to peacebuilding with an overview of voices (Curle, 1994; Featherston, 1998; Lederach, 1995; Nordstrom, 1992) that champion third party intervention as facilitating what must essentially be a ‘peacebuilding from below’ effort to chart more sustainable and locally owned paths to peace and justice.

Despite the difference in emphasis attached to the values of truth, justice, reconciliation and their overall contribution to peace, all authors conclude that there is no prescriptive solution for all post-war situations; rather a balanced process must be undertaken that will in time allow societies to heal. The overall conclusion is that ‘positive’ post-war peacebuilding would facilitate not only socio-economic and political rehabilitation, but also promote social justice and reconciliation, a much deeper and transformational intervention and that the challenges faced must not detract from its pursuit.

3.2. What sources of conflict should the intervention address?

Identifying the root causes of a particular conflict is a recommended first step for any intervention. This shapes the approach, methods, and tools employed. It is also an important departure point for most literature contributions to post-war peacebuilding debates.

Criticism of international post-war peacebuilding from research and academia offer more or less supportive appraisals of current efforts, although few reject the premise of international
engagement in post-war rehabilitation outright. The critiques are often recommendations to shift emphasis from one aspect of the intervention to another, in order to overcome identified post-conflict ‘deficits’ (for example military/security, political/institutional capacity, economic/social debilitation, and psycho/social trauma) closely linked to ‘root causes’ of that conflict (Miall et al, 1999, p.191). These ‘deficits’ offer the framework for the following literature overview.

Maynard (1999 in Croker et al, 2001 p.705) points to the need to address insecurity as key to successful post-war peace-building, as it is vital that freedom of movement, absence of personal or group threats, and safe access to resources is achieved for all in the post-war setting to even hint at a movement towards healing and reconciliation. Schnabel (2002) believes that the core principles of conflict prevention must inform post-settlement peacebuilding to effectively avoid a re-lapse into war and make it sustainable thus emphasizing the military/security deficit.

Stedman (2001, pp. 750-1) highlights the importance of keeping ‘peace spoilers’ in check through better intelligence and increased capabilities of deterrence in the military component of peace-building missions. He prioritises the demobilisation of armies, reintegration of soldiers to civilian life, and the successful transformation of armies into political actors (ibid). Nicole Ball (2001, p.726) also believes that the reform of the security sector in support of good governance and equitable socio-economic development is key to the sustainability of peace-building efforts.

Pugh (1995, 2000) leads the school of ‘developmentalist’ approaches to post-war peacebuilding, which point to poverty as the main source of conflict. He views socio-economic vulnerability as the main hindrance to local capacities to withstand political complex emergencies. He commends the UN for leading the way in expanding the conceptualisation of peacebuilding as a developmental approach to conflict management. Peirce and Stubbs (2000, p.158) also value the
contribution of integrated social development approaches to post-war peacebuilding, and view the combination of ‘good governance, physical reconstruction, and economic and social development’ as a winning formula against the recurrence of violence in post-war settings.

Most authors welcome the linkages between development and peace, but in response to the benign appraisal of this positive ‘link’, the following authors recognise this dominant trend but claim that it reinforces the system that led to the conflict in the first place. Duffield (1998, 2002) acknowledges that international post-settlement reconstruction is embracing conflict resolution and that there is a move towards more comprehensive approaches to building peace, but faults this approach for overlooking issues of ‘inequality, economic growth and resource distribution’. Duffield believes that peacebuilding normalises unjust situations by merely helping people to cope with the consequences of globalisation and ‘war economies’ (Duffield, 2000, pp.69-75).

Berdal and Malone (2000, p.2) share Duffield’s concerns and believe that the political economy of civil wars, which they consider to be a key source of ‘protractedness’ in many of today’s conflicts, remains unchallenged by current peace-building approaches. Collier (2000, p.91, 105) supports the economic agendas of war as key sources of conflict in his “greed over grievance” debate, and suggests that good peacebuilding must reduce incentives for those benefiting from war in order to reduce their influence over the process.

Paris (1997, p.57) warns of the need to acknowledge the underlying economic conditions that create the risk of violent conflict, and highlights the sometimes-worsening impact of peace-building interventions. He criticises the practice of conditioning economic assistance to governance, and the undue pressure that restructuring measures place on post-war societies. Paris
proposes a softer approach to market reform and structural adjustment, but a tougher stance on democratisation and institution building (2001, p.770).

Other authors emphasize the political and institutional deficit as being the key for post-war interventions. Cousens and Kumar (2001, p.4) believe the ‘fragility or collapse of political processes and institutions’ to be the main catalyst for war, while Kumar (1998, p.7) argues that post-conflict elections would restore the loss of legitimacy of political institutions and processes, thus institutionalising a conflict resolution mechanism into the body politic. Their point is reinforced by Brown (1996, p. 17) who perceives a greater threat to peace from the political manipulation of, say, economic or social cleavages, than the cleavages themselves. However, the consensus is that a political intervention alone could not deliver peace and that a long-term process of rehabilitation in all spheres of society is necessary (Kumar, 1998, p.216).

The last ‘deficit’ area to be addressed is the psychosocial dimension of conflict and its pervasive impact in the aftermath. Advocates of psychosocial healing view it as key to the internalisation of the peacebuilding process by afflicted populations. Rothstein (1999) points out: “[…] since there is obviously an important psychological or emotional component of protracted conflicts, there is […] likely to be an equally important psychological or emotional component to their resolution” (ibid, p.239). Pugh (1995, p.18) believes that an emphasis on structural causes of conflict underplays the “[…] psychological, spiritual and cultural determinants of violence”, and that “[…] reconciliation between social groups previously at war, requires more than money”. While Ryan (1990) criticises neglect of the inter-personal and psycho-social dimensions of peacebuilding, linked to current approaches overlooking the grassroots as an important intervention entry point.
Psycho-social approaches to peace-building highlight the need to engage mechanisms to restore inter-personal and inter-communal relations to complement existing processes of reconstruction at all levels of the intervention, from leadership (Track I) to grassroots (Track III). This approach, like all others gathered in the above overview, are ultimately championed not in isolation but as complementary of other aspects of post-war reconstruction that must also be addressed to build a sustainable peace.

In the debate of what sources of conflict must be prioritised in post-war peacebuilding interventions, ranging from material resource competition to perception and belief clashes, the conclusion must be that multiple causation calls for multi-dimensional interventions. The linkage between ‘peace-building deficits’ (Miall et al, 1999) is shared amongst most authors and point to comprehensive and integrated approaches to building peace that tackle both the symptoms and root causation of conflict. None advocate the tackling of their chosen area of intervention to the exclusion of all others. Most authors conclude their arguments with a call for ‘complementarity’, coordination between agencies to achieve it and the need to tackle both symptoms and root causes to build a sustainable peace. All agree to improve rather than abandon the international assistance to war-torn societies.

3.3.  Who should guide the intervention?

An important aspect of the debate about what constitutes good peacebuilding is that over who should lead the efforts to rebuild societies after war. The international community is taking its commitment to ‘exporting’ peace very seriously, but do those who ‘pay’ have the ultimate ‘say’?

In his study of eight peace settlements, Hampson (1996, p.23) assessed the factors that made them succeed or fail and found that third party intervention contributed greatly to successful post-
settlement peacebuilding. Hampson studied the four factors determining success or failure of peace settlement implementation – 3rd party role, structural characteristics of the conflict itself, regional/systemic dynamics, and the settlement’s ‘ingredients, concluding that the greater resources and staying power a 3rd party could muster, the greater the chances of a peace agreement to deliver sustainable peace (ibid, pp.9, 210).

Others place more emphasis in the ownership of the process by local constituencies to ensure sustainability. Large (1998) believes that the unique resources that local actors bring to the process makes it imperative that meaningful participation takes place. A successful peacebuilding intervention should enable “indigenous leadership and activity rather than importing either expectations or packaged solutions” (ibid, p.157). Diamond (1999, pp.84-5) also believes that peace must be built “from the inside out” and that interventions may only hope to catalyse change that must be brought about by local peacebuilders. Finally Stiefel (in Barakat and Chard, 2002, pp.817-835) advocates local ownership that goes beyond participation to transfer control from donors to recipients as local solutions tend to be “more effective, cheaper and more sustainable” (ibid, p.827).

This ‘peacebuilding from below’ has been criticised as being blind to social justice, when local ‘unjust’ power structures are strengthened through the engagement of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. Amongst this view the gender critique exposes the term ‘local actors’ as highly problematic in masquerading inequalities between men and women that are obscured by such homogenising labels. Thus to the question of whether international or local actors should lead the post-war peacebuilding process, the gender dimension must be mainstreamed if a positive peace is to be built (Reimann, 2001a; 2001b). A gender analysis of peacebuilding policy
implementation can help avoid what Pankhurst and Pearce (1997) refer to as a ‘gendered peace’, where gender-blind interventions fail to adequately address women’s needs.

The structures set up to implement post-war peace-building processes are often top-heavy, namely they concentrate both efforts and resources at the top level. Moreover, as has been identified by Uvin (2002), the trend towards greater coherence and coordination amongst international peacebuilding agencies further challenges the ownership of the process by local actors. Although this fact gives more prominence to outside interveners, the need for locally owned processes is generally accepted. The distinct but complementary resources that outside and inside actors can bring to a peacebuilding process are recognised by all authors.

3.4. What level of the intervention should drive the process?

A further layer of debate in the choice of peace-building approaches and one closely linked to the previous debate about local participation is determined by the preferred level of intervention: Track 1, 2 or 3.

Track 1 is the domain of official international diplomacy and government agencies, where political and military leaders operate. Havermans (1999, pp.134-5) praises the ability of official diplomacy to mobilise huge resources to entice or coerce, with ‘carrots’ or ‘sticks’, the warring parties to negotiation. He points to the advantage of Track One over other channels due to the access by diplomats to the ‘most important players in a conflict’. Bercovitch (1991, pp. 7-17), in his study of mediation in international conflict, found that “[…] the leader of a government, possessing rank and prestige and having some ‘leverage’, has a better chance of mediating successfully than any other actor”.
Jacobsen and Brand-Jacobsen (2002, pp.53, 74-75) criticise the focus on leaders as assuming that the appropriate representatives can be found, and that they will articulate and advocate the interests of their constituencies. This emphasis at the top may leave populations feeling isolated from the process, and thus top-level mediation must not be conducted in a ‘void’. Manning (2003) also highlights the challenges to implementation at the local level of a centrally agreed peace process. The lack of connectedness between the top and lower levels of the intervention must be overcome to make peacebuilding sustainable.

Lederach (1997, pp.41-2) similarly proposes a multi-level approach to peacebuilding that increases inter-connectedness between levels of intervention and co-operation between actors involved. However, he points to Track Two leaders as key actors by virtue of their distance from the confrontational politics dominating top echelons of conflict-ridden societies. They have the potential to act as intermediaries between the top and grassroots levels. The involvement of all sectors of society in peace-building is also highlighted by van Tongeren (1999, pp.124-5) as a key aspect often overlooked by interveners. However, he identifies Track One and Track Two as the key levels whose linkage will increase the success of a peace process.

Grassroots approaches include Alger’s (1991, in Large, 1998, p.23) who acknowledges the potential role of the population as ‘peacemakers’, or in this case ‘peace-builders’, without whose “knowledge, participation and support”, institutions “[…] cannot attain a strong and lasting peace”. Walker (1998, in Large 1998, p.23) highlights the potential for transformation by ‘critical social movements’ that challenge authority and power from marginalized standpoints, including gender.
Lewer and Ramsbotham (1993) suggest ‘multi-track’ diplomacy as an effective way to tackle ‘ethnic and regional conflict’ whose complexity requires a ‘systems approach’ and the premise that change at the grassroots cannot be imposed from above. Similarly, Fisher and Keashly (1991, in Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2000, p.97) suggest a ‘multi-modal, multi-level approach’ in which different but complimentary activities are employed to tackle the multiple causation of ‘inter-communal conflict’ at every level of the intervention.

Those advocating the primacy of Track One actors favour a top-down approach to peacebuilding where official diplomacy leads the peace process. Those highlighting the importance of Track Two actors would champion a more inclusive mid-up and mid-down approach, where middle range leadership links top leadership efforts and the population. The sponsors of Track Three peacebuilding would emphasize the role of grassroots leadership in nurturing peace constituencies necessary to sustain the process, thus advocating a bottom-up approach. But just as the debate around root causes and appropriate actions, the ultimate conclusion is that whatever level is emphasized it should be complemented by action at all levels for a ‘holistic’ approach to building-peace where all levels are integrated in a complementary and mutually reinforcing process.

3.5. What activities constitute post-war peacebuilding?

This overview of what activities are identified by authors as constituting peacebuilding is necessarily finite. However it offers a snapshot of a broadly defined peacebuilding ‘package’ that is shared by most.

Miall et al (1999) complete their ‘deficit’ approach (see p. 5 above) with a set of activities to address each. For example, to overcome the military-security deficit they suggest disarmament
and demobilisation, consolidation of a national army and police, the final demilitarisation of politics and the transformation of culture of violence to ones of peace. The political-constitutional deficit during the initial phase is addressed by transitional governing measures, in the medium term by the organising of a crucial second election, and finally the consolidation of good governance and civil society. The socio-economic deficit is first tackled with humanitarian relief, then a period of rehabilitation of infrastructure, and finally stable long-term economic policies are implemented. The psycho-social deficit must first address the parties’ mistrust, then balance the priorities of peace and justice with long-term measures such as the healing of psychological wounds and reconciliation (ibid, p.203).

Lederach (1997) proposes an intervention structure as a pyramid with the apex representing the top military, political and/or religious leadership; the middle level representing a mid-range leadership including sector, professional, ethnic or INGO leaders; and the grassroots leadership placed at the pyramid’s base. Each of the three ‘spaces’ contains activities to further the peace-building process. For example at the top, high-level negotiations, cease-fire agreements and highly visible mediation would be used. Whereas at the middle level problem-solving workshops, conflict resolution training, and peace commissions would be better suited. Finally, a grassroots intervention may include local peace commissions, grassroots training, prejudice reduction activities, and psychosocial work in post-war trauma recovery (ibid, p.39).

Lund (2001, pp.17-8) offers a peace-building ‘toolbox’ with a long list of activities categorised under seven headings:

- Official Diplomacy, including mediation, negotiation, conciliation, good offices, peace conferences, coercive diplomacy, diplomatic sanctions, etc;
- Non-official Conflict Management Methods, supporting indigenous dispute resolution mechanisms, peace commissions, non-official facilitation and problem-solving workshops;
- Military Measures, such as deterrence, restructuring and professionalisation of military forces, demobilisation/reintegration of ex-combatants, confidence-building and security, demilitarised zones, peace enforcement;
- Economic and Social Measures, like humanitarian assistance, development assistance, economic reforms, inter-communal trade, private investment, agricultural programs, aid conditionality, economic sanctions;
- Political Development and Governance Measures, including political party and institution building, election reform, support and monitoring, civic society development, training of officials, power-sharing arrangements, constitutional reform;
- Judicial and Legal Measures, such as inquiry commissions, war crimes tribunals, judicial/legal reforms, arbitration, police reform, adjudication;
- Communications and Education Measures, for example peace radio/TV, media professionalisation, journalist training, international broadcast, peace education, exchange visits, conflict resolution training.

The Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC) has compiled the following Peacebuilding Activities Chart:

- Conflict Resolution, such as community-based initiatives, second track diplomacy, mediation and negotiation;
- Early Warning, for example intelligence and monitoring, data collection/analysis; Civilian Participation in Peacekeeping Operations;
- Environmental Security, such as conflict assessment and resolution in relation to source depletion, human migration, etc;
- Physical Security, like demobilisation, disarmament, de-mining, protection of civilians, police/security reform;
- Economic Reconstruction, infrastructure development, market reform, financial/economic institution-building, micro-enterprise, credit assistance;
- Personal Security, targeting gender, sexual orientation and racial/cultural - specific violence;
- Human Rights, reporting/investigating, training, advocacy;
- Institutional/Civil Capacity Building, government and NGO capacity building, implementation of peace accords, promotion of transparency/accountability;
- Governance and Democratic Development, such as electoral assistance, civic education and training, judicial reform and training, media reform and training;
- Humanitarian Relief and Emergency Assistance, tackling basic needs (food, shelter, health, suffering);
- Training, peace-building training in any of the other activities, training of trainers; Social Reconstruction, including psychosocial trauma, reintegration of refugees/IDPs/combattants, social services, peace education;

Two important conclusions emerge from examining the above-collected sets. Firstly, there are many similarities in both the activities and the objectives they aim at achieving. For example all advise the improvement of physical security by activities such as demobilisation, disarmament, or the inclusion of as many societal sectors as possible in the intervention with a combination of aid, reforms, and capacity building. Secondly, the lists reviewed above include activities that both
explicitly adhere to conflict resolution (problem-solving workshops, mediation, and conciliation) whereas others have the potential of doing so if applied in a conflict sensitive manner (economic reform, relief and development, social service provision).

Although this debate is beyond the scope of this paper it is worth mentioning that the above sets of activities fall under two distinct but overlapping categories: those that do peacebuilding and those that contribute towards a wider peacebuilding process. The difference can be best understood as that between direct approaches - i.e. ‘stand alone’ conflict resolution interventions that make their objective explicit and indirect approaches - i.e. those attempting conflict transformation ‘by stealth’ through mainstreaming of peace-building (Atmar and Goodhand, 2002, p.47). The former, a narrower conception of peacebuilding, may lack conceptual connectedness to the overall intervention by creating an isolated sphere of activity that only a minority of the population experience. Nonetheless, it remains a powerful reminder to both interveners and stakeholders that peace is what they are working towards. The latter, a broader conception of peacebuilding, suggests the interdependence of the diverse sources of conflict and a more integrated intervention. However, it may lack the explicit peace vision that Lederach has argued is needed to drive the process (Lederach, 2001, p.845).

Having made the above clarification, the lists of activities found in the literature that both do and/or contribute towards peacebuilding have apparent and significant similarities, supporting the idea of a growing consensus in the literature about what constitutes ‘good post-war peacebuilding’.
3.6. When and for how long should post-war peacebuilding happen?

Many authors follow the ‘negative’ to ‘positive’ peace continuum to divide the peace-building process into distinct phases. This type of incremental or gradual approach suggests that the setting must be ‘secured’ before other peace-building activities take place, namely that the hawks must ‘boxed’ before the doves are ‘released’ (Last, 2000; Baker, 2001, p.763). Last (2000) suggests that while the ‘securing’ of the environment takes a more prominent role at the earliest stage of a peace-building mission, the positive peace-building tasks must begin simultaneously albeit in a ‘catalytic and organising’ role. The incremental sequence is paralleled by the process of devolution of authority from internationals to locals, a process Last suggests may take place in three years (ibid, p.94).

Paris (2001, p.780) problematises the focus on ‘dates’ suggesting that international organisations engaged in peace-building must revise their time frames to link them to the accomplishment of specific objectives instead. He advises that peace-building missions should last longer than the average three years, possibly for as long as ten. This vision coincides with Lederach’s “decade” thinking shifting from short-term to long-term approaches to peace-building interventions (2001, p.846).

Lederach (1997) suggests that from the very beginning of the intervention a connection should be made to the overarching vision that will drive the process for generations (ibid, p.77). The final proposal is then to construct a ‘working matrix for developing an infrastructure for peace-building’ that tackles first the crisis stage and issues for a period of 2-6 months; then the people and relationships for 1-2 years; then the institutions or sub-system for 5-10 years; and finally the vision of peace and desired future that all hope for and move towards and that will need work for generations (ibid, p.115).
Despite the difference of opinions about the length of time each phase of an intervention may take, there is a clear consensus about the need to implement an incremental approach the ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ peacebuilding activities of post-settlement rehabilitation.

3.7. Problematising this consensus

The trend amongst the above academic definitions of post-war peacebuilding is supportive of the need to build a positive peace from the rubble of war, including justice and equality. There is consistent support for interventions to address all ‘peace deficit areas’ of the setting, as multiple causes of conflict require multi-dimensional interventions. All support a cooperative endeavour between international and local actors that is in turn inclusive of all members of the intervened society, and although peacebuilding ‘gaps’ are pinpointed at different levels by different authors, the agreement is that a complementary multi-track intervention would strengthen vertical and horizontal ‘connectors’ (Anderson, 1999).

Most proposals display common elements to peacebuilding programs such as demobilisation, demining, disarmament, establishment of international and local civilian police forces, rebuilding infrastructure, establishment of the rule of law and a working judiciary, institution-building, socio-economic rehabilitation, organising and supervising electoral processes, education and promotion of human rights, democratisation, capacity-building, and psycho-social healing. The overall consensus is the inherent ‘goodness’ of intervening in post-war societies to alleviate suffering, a premise that is controversially uncritical, and by proxy supportive, of the liberal democratic peace endeavour (Duffield, 2002; Paris, 2001, 2002; Richmond, 2004a, 2004b).

A number of problematic issues arise from the convergence in defining best approaches to post-war peacebuilding identified in the preceding review:
. Too broad! A consensual definition of peacebuilding that diverse organisations can adhere to, cooperate over, or jointly evaluate, often represents the lowest common denominator. This results in broad definition and terminology that do not reflect the richness of peacebuilding activity, the implementation process or its impact and outcome.

. Too generic! This consensual definition of peacebuilding, albeit broad, is becoming a dominant paradigm for interventions across the globe. However, it is being theoretically defined by mainly Western institutions. This has the potential to attribute universality to culturally situated values and assumptions.

. Too dominant! The consensus built around one particular way of defining peacebuilding makes alternative definitions harder to take hold. Consensus can sometimes stifle critique. This is particularly relevant in negotiating shared international-local definitions of what peace to build, when dominant Western approaches leave little room for locally owned approaches to be articulated and incorporated into programs. 

. Too un-reflexive! The above reviewed academic enquiries into post-war peacebuilding address conflict causation, activities, actors, timing, aims, levels of intervention, but fail to question the assumptions, values, principles underpinning the interventions they support.

4. Converging post-war peacebuilding policy: The emergence of a post-war peacebuilding community

During the 1990s international organisations involved in humanitarian relief and development responded to calls for more widespread grassroots participation in post-war peace processes by beginning to include a peacebuilding agenda in their programmes (Stiles, 2000, pp.114-5). This
was partly driven by a recognition of the potential impacts of humanitarian aid on peace and conflict (Anderson 1999), and partly by the expansion of INGO relations with UN Agencies and military establishments, and an increasing formalisation of relations with their donor governments (Duffield 2002: 54).

Post-war peacebuilding has now become the focus of both increasing resources and attention from international actors, including Government development agencies, the military, private sector, global financial institutions, International NGOs (INGOs), International Government Organisations (IGOs), local NGOs (LNGOs), as well as academia and research organisations. Although methods and strategies may differ, actors that have traditionally held clashing agendas are now sharing a conceptual and operational language, and, at least rhetorically, adhering to similar principles and aims, forming the basis of a growing international post-war peacebuilding community.

A recent UNDP document observed that the past decade has been a period of significant institutional adaptation as the development community has turned its attention to crises with a renewed appreciation of how, individually and collectively, members can better assist countries emerging from violent conflict. These developments have opened up a host of new, different kinds of partnerships (UNDP, 2001, p.9). The World Bank, for example, once rarely operating in complex emergencies, is now active in places such as East Timor, Kosovo and Sierra Leone, operating with significant grant funds promoting ‘peace and reconciliation’ (World Bank, 2001, vii). The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has over the past decade expanded its activities beyond protection and repatriation to include reintegration measures, which include mediation and explicit conflict resolution components. UNDP is now actively involved in disarmament and demobilisation of combatants as well as reconciliation
initiatives (UNDP, 2001, p.9). Organisations involved in post-war reconstruction are expanding their mandates to embrace a wider, more comprehensive approach to building peace from the rubble of war.

The grouping of such diverse actors under the label ‘international post-war peacebuilding community’ label is not unproblematic. This eclectic group has been here so labelled, not under the assumption that they constitute a homogenous entity, nor in the belief that their individual agendas are now indistinguishable. Indeed their individual agendas continue to compete in other arenas, but in the case of post-war reconstruction there appears to be both a normative and practical closeness. The following section explores the growing convergence around the definitions and aims of post-war peacebuilding amongst organisations involved in its implementation.

4.1 Organisational overview: Some examples of convergent peacebuilding policy

Below are six examples of what organisations ‘say’ about their role in post-war peacebuilding. It gathers data from diverse sources: policy papers, official reports, speeches, meetings agendas and resolutions, etc. The varied organisations featured have been chosen to represent six categories (military, UN Agency, NGO, Government Development Agency, global financial institution, IGO) to facilitate analytical discussion rather than to reflect rigid boundaries between them. The definitions of peace given below reveal that previously divergent agendas have given way in the past decade to much more consensual approaches to implementing post-settlement reconstruction policy.

NATO describes its mandate in post-war settings as being about building bridges between communities and not only about preventing violence, securing freedom of movement for vulnerable
populations, ensuring the safe return of IDPs and refugees that are very effective confidence-building measures (NATO, 2003).

UNHCR defines peacebuilding as ‘the process whereby national protection and the rule of law are re-established. More specifically, it entails an absence of social and political violence, the establishment of effective judicial procedures, the introduction of pluralistic forms of government, and the equitable distribution of resources’ (UNHCR 1997, in Chimni, 2002).

Catholic Relief Services (CRS), a large international NGO, believes that peacebuilding must engage a holistic approach to interventions that address and transform the root causes of conflict. It promotes its explicit peacebuilding agenda by supporting education and training programs, engaging in prevention and early warning, promoting peace and justice commissions, supporting gender equality, hosting inter-religious dialogues, engaging in cross-divide development initiatives, through advocacy and citizen diplomacy, sponsoring research, developing psycho-social and trauma healing programs, amongst other activities (Galama and van Tongeren, 2002).

USAID (Office for Transition Initiatives) lists the following peace-building target issues as being key in its post-war interventions: citizen security, reintegration of ex-combatants, mine action, internally displaced persons (IDPs), democratic political processes, transparency/good governance, civil society development, civilian-military relations, human rights, media, community impact activity, women, children and youth. One of its main areas of engagement in peace-building is interethnic/interfaith reconciliation, considered a major cornerstone in “building democratic institutions, reintegrating communities, healing physical and psychological wounds, and promoting a sense of hope for a better future” (USAID, 2003).
The World Bank defines the aims of its post-war interventions as attempting to rebuild the economic and physical infrastructure, strengthening institutional capacity and providing a base for sustainable development. Furthermore, it has added demobilisation of soldiers, de-mining and displaced population re-integration to its core activities while making ‘peace and social harmony’ and integrative objective for its policies and programs. It describes its objectives as “the consolidation of peace, the fostering of social reconciliation and the initiation of sustainable growth” where it intervenes (Newman and Schnabel, 2002).

The EU’s vision of peacebuilding entails long-term efforts aimed at preventing armed conflict from erupting in the first place by addressing its deep-rooted structural causes. This includes broader measures in the political, institutional, economic and developmental fields, such as combating poverty, promoting an equitable distribution of resources, pursuing justice and reconciliation, upholding the rule of law and human rights, supporting good governance and human rights, including accountability and transparency in public decision-making, political pluralism and the effective participation of civil society in the peace-building process (EU, 2001).

The arbitrary selection of organisations and the brief sound bites offered makes the above somewhat anecdotal, but they do reflect a growing normative and methodological consensus that has been comprehensively addressed in the peacebuilding literature (Duffield, 2000, 2002; Richmond, 2004a, 2004b; Stiles, 2000; Bush, in Keating and Knight 2004; Knight in Keating and Knight 2004; Paris, 2002). For example, Smillie and Helmich have noted a ‘homogenisation’ of INGOs (1993, p.23) as a result of convergent approaches and adherence to an increasingly standardised peacebuilding delivery package. While Bojicic-Dzelilovic (in Newman and Schnabel, 2002, pp.81-98) adds that a dominant development paradigm is drawing diverse organisations towards greater complementarity of action in reconstruction programmes. Bush
(2004, p. 25) has noted the ‘commodification of peacebuilding’, as mass-produced initiatives that conform to a ‘Northern blueprint’ have become dominant in post-war interventions (ibid, p.24). An exploration into the processes behind this growing consensus will support the findings.

4.2. Explaining organisational convergence around post-war peacebuilding: Why is this happening?

The international post-war peacebuilding community is converging around both pragmatic (1) and increasingly ideological (2) principles.

(1) The overall fall of development aid and a growing disengagement from direct bilateral assistance by donor Governments, in favour of sub-contracting, has aided this process of convergence and cooperation amongst diverse organisations (Duffield, 2002, p.54, p.73). For example, donor governments ‘employ’ INGOs as service providers in the field while delegating more and more reconstruction activities to the private sector. This donor driven process has resulted in closer relationships between state and non-state actors involved in post-war peacebuilding. The increasingly coordinated ‘international support system’ is converging around a dwindling, centralised and optimised funding flow that has prompted these often-uneasy alliances (UNDP, 2001, p.124). The 'homogenisation' of INGOs is partly due to their following donor agendas too closely (Smillie and Helmich, 1993)

(2) There is growing support amongst the international peacebuilding community for a global system rooted in liberal principles of open economies and open societies, built around democratic principles, and offering improved standards of living. This value laden 'liberal democratic peace’ (Duffield, 2002; Paris, 2002) permeates into every policy aspect of post-war reconstruction interventions.
4.3. Exploring the process of organisational convergence: How is this happening?

The articulation and transformation of the above into convergent policy happens through three interlinked processes: growing coordination mechanisms for policy development and implementation of peacebuilding programmes (1), the transfer of ‘best practice’ through evaluation and guidelines (2), and the shaping of global agendas by donor Governments (3).

(1) The UN is driving this process; the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) has opened several post-conflict peacebuilding support offices headed by representatives of the Secretary-General, tasked to provide leadership on the development of peace-building strategies. Its Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) emerged from the former Department for Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) in 1997, with a strong, field-based capacity for humanitarian coordination and uses the Consolidated Appeal Process with increasing success as a planning and coordination tool (UNDP, 2001, p.9). The result has been a convergence of actors working in post-war situations, with different mandates, operational modalities, and resources forging new partnerships and establishing robust coordination systems in the field. This in principle sounds good, but these overpowering implementing structures can leave little room in the field for local and/or alternative definitions of peacebuilding.

(2) The emphasis in transferring knowledge between organisations involved in peacebuilding through field evaluation and consultation has produced influential policy documents such as the OECD 1997 Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation; UN 1992/1995 Agenda for Peace, and the 2000 UN Brahimi Report. However the convergence of criteria of what constitutes ‘good’ peacebuilding means that often the same lessons keep being re-learnt and policy regurgitated.
(3) Governments shape the global peacebuilding agenda through donor conferences around programme areas or specific interventions that impact on the priorities adopted by INGOs, IGOs, and other non-state actors. The knock on effect on local NGOs is eventually felt through processes such as conditionality of aid or strict funding criteria, thus completing the top-down transmission of policy to the grassroots.

4.4. Challenging this convergence: The theory-practice gap

There are voices amongst academia who view the rhetorical convergence in peace-building amongst financial institutions, donor government, IGOs, and INGOs as masking the contradictory aims still pursued in the field (Barakat and Chard, 2002, pp.817-835). The consensus about peacebuilding is described by Barakat and Chard (ibid) as representing only agreement about what agencies ought to be doing, but not a transformation of approaches in the field. Stiefel (in Barakat and Chard, 2002, p.818) adds that despite a growing consensus about peacebuilding, inappropriate strategies identified by critical literature in the 80s and 90s are still evident today due to the resistance to change within the very same organisations advocating it. However, despite continuity of approaches and mistakes, the growing consensus around post-war peacebuilding, and the funding rewards for its supporters, is providing a powerful incentive for cooperation and coordination in the field. The ‘peacebuilding’ message may be conveyed in a more or less cooperative or effective manner in the field, but it is nonetheless conveyed to local peacebuilding actors keen to become ‘implementing partners’ to intervening international actors.

Von Hippel also challenges the closeness of these actors, reminding us of their organisational distinctiveness. She identifies five ‘international communities’ (2002, pp.714-5) engaged in post-war peacebuilding: donor governments, militaries, multilateral organisations, private sector, and nongovernmental organisations. She identifies the main contribution each brings to the field, for
example governments bring resources, militaries bring expertise on violence reduction, and NGOs bring specialisation and independence. Von Hippel argues that there may be a consensus amongst them on general aims, such as a general preference of peace, democracy and economic development over war, authoritarianism and poverty, but beyond that crucial differences emerge. These ‘communities’ enter the field with different missions, organisational cultures, sources of support, and dominant constituencies (ibid). However, despite distinct agendas and mandates of organisations Von Hippel ignores a crucial factor driving coordination and consensual approaches: that of funding and ultimate political control by donor governments of all the organisations involved. This separation of ‘communities’ is unrealistic when in fact governments are the main donors for multilateral organisations and NGOs, while being the political authority that controls the military.

5. Conclusion

The growing consensus about post-war peacebuilding being an effective way of reducing violent conflict, promoting political stability and supporting longer-term development and global security goals has forced both observers and practitioners to define and articulate a ‘model’ of good post-war peacebuilding theory and practice. This paper has highlighted the principled and practical ‘problems’ of such growing convergence.

The principled problems of the discussed consensus relate to the message the growing consensus sends to policymakers, donors and the field. The blooming peacebuilding literature delivers a convergence around aims and approaches, at the expense of a critical examination of the values and principles underpinning these interventions. The strong ideological message travelling to the field embedded into the structures of coordination and implementation to be found in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan, etc, seemed to have been largely overlooked. The
critiques offered by authors such as Chandler (1999a, 1999b, 2004) Paris (1997, 2001, 2002), or Duffield (1998, 2000, 2002) are weak on feasible alternatives, but are correct in ‘naming and shaming’ the implicit support of the liberal democratic peace project so vigorously promoted by the Western Powers. The current Iraq intervention and the ‘global war on terror’ present an unavoidable challenge to peacebuilding and conflict resolution researchers and implementing agencies, as post-war peacebuilding becomes the ‘reward’ or carrot used to legitimise controversial military intervention.

The practical problems relate to finding an operational definition of post-war peacebuilding that enables conflict transformation instruments and processes to be mainstreamed into reconstruction activities such as democratisation, demilitarisation, and economic reform. One argument emphasises the worth of keeping the conceptualisation of post-war peacebuilding broad to enable implementers to coherently integrate the diverse activities that may contribute to peace (See Section 3.5). However, this holistic approach, which defines peacebuilding as a guiding aim, remains insufficient because in practice it often means adding the term as an afterthought: attaching a peacebuilding label to well-established practices.

Post-war peacebuilding must become an applicable concept, to enable mainstreaming into programming in the field as well as into policy, and to stop it becoming little more than ‘good intentions’. However, it must also move beyond the technical to encompass and explicitly convey for scrutiny the principles and values that unavoidably underpin peacebuilding interventions. To ‘earn’ the label of peacebuilding, agencies engaged in post-war intervention must adhere to a four-dimensional definition of peacebuilding encompassing: (1) An explicit and transparent aim and intention to build a positive peace, (2) a recognisable and contextualised set of activities that both directly and indirectly contribute to building a positive peace, (3) a peace-enhancing
implementation approach based on ‘real’ participation and inclusion of local peacebuilders, and finally (4) a measurable peacebuilding ‘impact’. Post-war peacebuilding both in theory and in practice must be about intentions, means and ends and it must own up to all three to re-claim its rightful transformational agenda.
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